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ABSTRACT 
 
Philip B. Kiffer: Actors in a “Cheap Comedy”: Dissidents in Soviet Psychiatric Institutions, 
1968-1974 
(Under the direction of Donald J. Raleigh) 
 
 
 
This paper examines the Soviet government's hospitalization of political dissidents 
diagnosed with mental disorders between 1968 and 1974. Relying primarily on memoir accounts 
produced by the victims of Soviet punitive psychiatry, the purpose of this paper is to explicate 
the purpose, function, and effectiveness of the Soviet program of committing dissidents to 
psychiatric institutions. It concludes that this program served primarily to control behavior, 
rather than suppress ideas or counter-ideologies, embarrassing to the Soviet government. 
Furthermore, it suggest that in many cases committing dissidents to mental hospitals served the 
state as a means of negotiating with dissidents and reaching an agreement on what constitutes 
acceptable behavior, instead of functioning simply as a way to remove them from general 
society. This paper also argues that some dissidents possessed means of pressuring the state, and 
that the dialogue between political malcontents and government authorities was not a one sided 
conversation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“If you don’t want to be kept here very long, don’t act so important. People don’t want to 
think. They won’t understand you if you speak too much. Don’t intellectualize, keep it simple: ‘I 
want to go home, I want kasha.’”1 A paramedic (fel'dsher) offered this friendly advice to 
Alexander Sergeevich Esenin-Vol'pin, a prominent Soviet dissident and one of the founders of 
Soviet Human Rights movement,
2
 as he was being transported to Moscow City Psychiatric 
Hospital no. 5 to undergo psychiatric treatment. The cause of his treatment was the result of 
years of opposition to the Soviet government rather than any symptoms of mental illness. 
However, Esenin-Vol'pin was on route to a public mental hospital, not a prison. The purpose of 
his visit, and the hospitalization of many other dissidents, was to learn the difference between 
what constituted and acceptable and unacceptable behavior in the eyes of the regime. As the 
paramedic suggested, the sooner he learned his place, the sooner he could go home.  
In the late 1960s and 1970s a burgeoning dissident
3
 movement proved a growing source 
of international and domestic embarrassment for the Soviet Union of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev 
                                                          
1
 A.S. Esenin-Vol'pin, Filosofiia, Logika, Poėziia, zashchita prav cheloveka: Izbrannoe (Moscow: Rossiĭskiĭ 
gosudarstvennyĭ gumanitarnyĭ universitet, 1999), 103. 
 
2
For more on Vol'pin and his philosophy of dissent see Esenin-Vol'pin, Filosofiia, Logika, Poėziia, zashchita prav 
cheloveka; ; Benjamin Nathans, “The Dictatorship of Reason: Aleksandr Volʹpin and the Idea of Rights under 
‘Developed Socialism,’” Slavic Review 66, no. 4 (2007): 630-63 
 
3
 The Russian word for dissent is inakomyslie. The literal translation of inakomyslie is “differently thinking,” but this 
fails to capture the true meaning of the word. It is often translated as “dissent” – which in English may simply mean 
to hold an opinion different from that of the majority. However, in Russian “dissent” possesses a more specific 
definition denoting action taken for a minority position and/or against the majority opinion or structure. Therefore, 
inakomyslie may perhaps best be understood as active dissent, which implies “different thinking” as well as, more 
importantly, different behavior. Therefore, dissent in this paper should be understood as active opposition to the 
state, rather than simply possessing oppositionist opinions.  
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(1964-1982). Increasingly focused on human rights, grassroots opposition to the Soviet system 
that took the form of protests, letter writing campaigns, and circulation of samizdat (materials 
copied by hand or on a typewriter and circulated domestically) and tamizdat (materials published 
abroad), challenged the regime’s claims of near universal popular support for the Communist 
Party and its leaders. To deal with the problem, in the late 1960s Soviet leaders began to use 
psychiatry as a tool to combat what they saw as political opposition. Hospitalization in a 
psychiatric institution provided a means of solving the USSR’s image problem. As Valeriia 
Il'inichna Novodvorskaia, a political victim of the Kazan Special Psychiatric Hospital and after 
1991 a Russian politician, points out, using the judicial system to punish dissenters would have 
destroyed the image of a population united behind its leaders. However, there was no need for 
the government to explain the presence of disturbed people, because as Novodvorskaia put it, “In 
the West there are also plenty of crazies.”4 Yet, these methods also allowed dissidents the 
opportunity to use a narrative of psychiatric abuse against the Brezhnev regime. In this way, the 
psychiatric hospital became the site of a faceoff between Soviet political dissidents and the 
authorities. 
Although the experience of each hospitalized dissident is unique, some generalizations 
can be made about punitive psychiatry in the Soviet Union under Brezhnev. In some cases, 
patients claimed they were hospitalized in order to save the state the embarrassment of putting 
them on trial. In other instances, they believed they were locked up to encourage them to cease 
politically dangerous activity or to obtain information from them. But they never doubted the 
political nature of their “treatment.” As Iuriĭ Vladimirovich Mal'tsev, an Italian language and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Additionally, there are two words in Russian for dissidents—dissidenty and inakomyslaiushchie. I translate both 
terms as dissidents. However, any mention of dissidents in this paper should be read while bearing in mind the 
active connotation of the Russian definition of dissent. 
4
 Valeriia Novodvorskaia, Po tu storonu otchaianiia (Moscow: Novosti, 1993), 49 
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cultural specialist committed to Kashchenko Psychiatric Hospital in October 1969, observed, 
attempts to explain psychiatric treatment to patients as medically necessary always came off as 
transparent and half-hearted. When the authorities tried to do so, “they spoke with false voices, 
like hapless amateurs on a poorly constructed stage.”5 There was no hiding the fact that 
psychiatry was an excuse to talk politics.  
 Scholarship on the Soviet Union has only recently begun to tell the story of the Soviet 
dissident movement, a topic difficult to research during the years of Soviet power for obvious 
reasons. Although the historiography of political opposition to the state continues to grow,
 6
 the 
topic of political abuse of psychiatry has yet to be sufficiently explicated from a historical 
perspective.
7
 Despite provoking an impressive amount of English-language and other foreign-
language literature  by political scientists, psychiatrists, and other experts in the 1970s and 80s, 
                                                          
5
 Iu. Mal'tsev, Reportazh iz sumasshedshego doma (N.p: Izdanie novogo zhurnala, 1974), 34. 
 
6
 The historical literature on the Soviet dissident movement is small but growing. Philip Boobbyer monograph 
examines history of “conscience” and the moral/ethical elements of Russian dissent beginning in the 
prerevolutionary period and extending to the post-Soviet era. See Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia 
(New York: Routledge, 2005).  Ann Komaromi interrogates the role of samizdat in the Soviet dissident movement. 
See “Samizdat and Soviet Dissident Publics,” Slavic Review 71, no. 1 (2012): 70-90. Benjamin Nathans authored 
several articles on the Soviet human rights movement. See “Soviet Rights-Talk in the Post-Stalin Era,” in Human 
Rights in the Twentieth Century, edited by Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011): 166-90; “The Disenchantment of Socialism: Soviet Dissidents, Human Rights, and the New Global 
Morality,” in The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s, edited by Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014): 33-48; “The Dictatorship of Reason.” Barbara Walker analyzes Soviet 
dissident charity movement and the self-purification of the dissident community. See “Pollution and Purification in 
the Moscow Human Rights Networks of the 1960s and 1970s,” Slavic Review 68, no. 2 (2009): 376-95. Robert 
Horvath has written on the Soviet dissident movement under Gorbachev and its impact on post-Soviet Russia. See 
The Legacy of Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, Democratisation and Radical Nationalism in Russia (New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2005). 
There is also a growing literature on religious dissent in the Soviet Union. See Nicholas Ganson, “Orthodox 
Dissidence as De-Atomization: Father Dmitrii Dudko and His Battle with Razobshchennost'” The Soviet and Post-
Soviet Review 40, no. 1 (2013): 90-114; Emily B. Baran, Dissent on the Margins: How Soviet Jehovah’s Witnesses 
Defied Communism and Lived to Preach about It (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
 
7
 There are some works on the topic. Rebecca Reich examined the literary efforts of hospitalized dissidents to 
“redefine madness” and maintain their sanity, see Rebecca Reich, “Inside the Psychiatric Word: Diagnosis and Self-
Definition in the Late Soviet Period,” Slavic Review 73, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 563-84. See also Robert van Voren, On 
Dissidents and Madness: From the Soviet Union of Leonid Brezhnev to the “Soviet Union” of Vladimir Putin (New 
York: Rodopi, 2009); Cold War in Psychiatry: Human Factors, Secret Actors (New York: Rodopi, 2010); Mark G. 
Field, “Commitment for Commitment or Conviction for Conviction: The Medicalization and Criminalization of 
Soviet Dissidence, 1960-1990.” Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 1995 22, no. 3 (1995): 275-89. 
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and boasting wide coverage in American and West European newspapers, the historical 
discussion of the role punitive medicine played in the development of the conflict between 
dissidents and the state remains underdeveloped.
8
 
 The purpose of this paper is to examine and illuminate dissident accounts of the Soviet 
Union’s program of punitive psychiatry and involuntary hospitalization from 1968 through 1974. 
Drawing on four of the most influential memoirs describing personal experience in Soviet mental 
institutions, in addition to the most important contemporaneous samizdat journal Khronika 
Tekushchikh Sobitiĭ (KhTS), (the Chronicle of Current Events), and other relevant samizdat 
sources, I consider two principle aspects of dissident accounts of their hospitalization. First, what 
transgression, in the author’s opinion, resulted in his or her incarceration? Second, how did 
dissidents write about life inside the psychiatric hospital? What do descriptions of their 
prescribed “treatments” and interactions with doctors reveal about the state’s approach to 
dissidents and its impact on dissent? By looking at these accounts, I hope to draw some 
generalizations about the Soviet Union’s program of punitive medicine and the experience of 
dissidents in psychiatric hospitals. 
 It is important to note, that while dissent in the Soviet Union was diverse and 
multifaceted, I focus exclusively on political dissidents, i.e. dissidents opposing the Brezhnev 
regime on political grounds. However, the Soviet Union used psychiatry as a repressive tool to 
combat all types of dissent. Religious and national oppositionists of a number of different sects 
and ethnicities were among the victims of Soviet political psychiatry. I choose to concentrate on 
                                                          
8
  Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway were the two most prominent producers of such works and advocated for the 
international community to pressure the Soviet Union to release dissidents interned in mental hospitals. See, Sidney 
Bloch and Peter Reddaway, Psychiatric Terror: How Soviet Psychiatry is Used to Suppress Dissent (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977); Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, Soviet Psychiatric Abuse: The Shadow over World 
Psychiatry (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984). For examples of contemporaneous literature by other authors, see 
Harvey Fireside, Soviet Psychoprisons (New York: Norton, 1979). 
 5 
 
political dissidents due to the fact that the sources available to me, allow for a clearer explication 
of their interactions with the state. Additionally, the histories of political, religious, and national 
dissent in the Soviet Union are ultimately different stories with their own origin and evolution—
even as they pertain to psychiatric abuse. Therefore, I decided to limit myself to explicating the 
relationship between political dissidents and the state and to leave other branches of dissent to 
future scholars.  
Memoirs are an invaluable source for historians, allowing access to the constructed 
thoughts, motivations, and feelings of our subjects, but nonetheless are a difficult source to 
interrogate.
9
 Slavicist Beth Holmgren asserts that memoirs invoke a relationship between the 
authors and readers “in which the reader can presume independent knowledge of the events and 
experiences the writer represents.”10 Holmgren reminds us, however, that, “the memoir [came] to 
be used in Russia as a mode of wrestling and bestowing power, of endorsing and subverting the 
sociopolitical status quo, and, almost invariably, valuing the individual self insofar as it 
interpreted, served, and connected with the ‘real’ context it depicted.”11  Reading the firsthand 
accounts I work with in this paper, I have tried to keep in mind the authors’ objectives both to 
create a historically “accurate” account of events as well as their personal politics. 
The memoirs I address in this paper, all products of the Brezhnev era, fall into the genre 
historian Phillip Boobbyer calls “dissident biography.” He writes, “The dissident biography . . . 
differs from other contemporary biographies in that it was rooted in a ‘specific dialogue with 
                                                          
9
 For more on reading Soviet memoirs, see Hiroaki Kuromiya, “Soviet Memoirs as a Historical Source,” Russian 
History 12, no. 2-4 (1985): 293-326; Irina Paperno, Stories of the Soviet Experience: Memoirs, Diaries, Dreams 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Beth Holmgren, editor, The Russian Memoir: History and Literature 
(Evanston, Il: Northwestern University Press, 2003). 
 
10
 Beth Holmgren, “Introduction,” in The Russian Memoir, ed. Holmgren, xii. 
 
11
 Ibid., xxii. 
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power’ and a certain ‘paradigm of protest.’”12 The audience of these works was not the regime or 
their political opponents, who they did not attempt to influence. Rather, they addressed “a third 
party—public opinion—both at home and abroad.”13 The primary goal of these authors was to 
advertise their plight and mobilize public opinion to support their cause. To do so they addressed 
both a domestic and international audience. 
The memoirs I work with in this paper are Iuriĭ Mal'tsev’s Reportazh iz sumasshedshego 
doma (Report from a Madhouse), Evgeniĭ Nikolaev’s Predavshie Gippokrata (The Betrayal of 
Hippocrates), Zhores Medvedev’s Kto sumasshedshiĭ (Who’s Crazy?, coauthored with his 
brother Roĭ Medvedev), and Leonid Pliushch’s Na karnavale istorii (History’s Carnival).14 They 
are part of a small canon of memoir literature detailing the personal experience dissidents had 
with punitive psychiatry in the Soviet Union. Excluding article-length works, there are five other 
memoirs written in the Soviet period, besides the works I use, which fit into this canon.
15
 
                                                          
12
Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, 80-81. 
 
13
Ibid., 81.  
 
14
 See Mal'tsev, Reportazh iz sumasshedshego doma; Evgeniĭ Nikolaev, Predavshie Gippokrata (London: Overseas 
Publications Exchange Ltd, 1984); Zh.A. Medvedev and R.A. Medvedev, Kto sumasshedshiĭ? (London: Macmillan, 
1971); Leonid Pliushch, Na karnavale istorii (London: Overseas Publications Exchange Ltd., 1979). 
Nikolaev’s work was originally published in German as Gehirnwäsche in Moskau : Ein Betroffener Berichtet 
(Munich: Schultz, 1983); there is no English translation of the book. Zhores and Roy Medvedev’s memoir was 
simultaneously published in English in 1971 and appeared in Chinese, Spanish, and French later in the 1970s; see 
Zhores A. Medvedev and Roy A. Medvedev, A Question of Madness, translated by Ellen de Kadt (New York: 
Knopf, 1971). Leonid Pliusch’s autobiographical account was published in English shortly after its release in 
Russian with an added contribution by his wife Tatiana; see Leonid Pliushch and Tatyana Pliushch, History’s 
Carnival: A Dissident’s Autobiography, edited and translated by Marco Carynnyk (London: Collins and Harvill 
Press, 1979). To this day Mal'tsev’s work is available only in Russian. 
 
15
 The history of firsthand accounts begins with Valeriĭ Tarsis’s, a Russian writer and literary critic opposed to the 
Communist regime, fictionalized account based on his time at Kashchenko Psychiatric Hospital between 1963 and 
1964, Palata no. 7 (Frankfurt: Posev, 1966). Tarsis’s novel was originally published in English as Ward 7: An 
Autobiographical Novel, translated by Katya Brown (New York: Dutton, 1965). I do not include this account 
because of its fictionalization. Victor Nekipelov authored a samizdat book detailing his psychiatric evaluation in the 
Serbskii Institute. I do not examine it because Nekipelov never spent time in a psychiatric hospital. See Institut 
durakov: Dokumental'naia povest' “Institut Durakov” i izbrannye stikhotvoreniia (Barnaul, Russian Federation: 
Pomoshch' postradavshim ot psikhiatrov, 2005). Also, see Victor Nekipelov, Institute of Fools: Notes from the 
Serbsky, edited and translated by Marco Carynnyk and Marta Horban (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1980). I 
exclude the works of General Petr Grigorenko and Vladimir Bukovsky from my source base due to their atypical 
 7 
 
Additionally several more autobiographical works have been published since the fall of the 
Soviet Union.
16
 I selected the works above because they shed light on the era after the crushing 
of the Prague Spring when the Soviet Union began a crackdown on domestic political opposition 
signaling the end of the Thaw. Furthermore, I privileged memoirs of dissidents hospitalized both 
in public mental hospitals (psikhiatricheskaia bol'nitsa obshchego tipa)—designed to serve the 
public and treated those who were not considered “socially dangerous elements”—and special 
psychiatric hospitals (psikhiatricheskaia bol'nitsa spetsial'nogo tipa, spetsial'naia 
psikhiatricheskaia bol'nitsa, spetspsikhbol'nitsa, SPB). Essentially the mental ward of a prison, 
SPBs were designed to treat convicted criminals who were considered to present a danger to 
society.
17
  I take this approach to compare the difference in experience and treatment at the two 
types of institutions. With the exception of Nikolaev’s account, the authors wrote their accounts 
during or shortly after their incarceration. The authors come from diverse backgrounds, but they 
all collectively belong to the Soviet “intelligentsia.” This was not an intentional choice on my 
part, but reflects the Soviet government’s anxiety toward the intelligentsia during this period. 
I complement these memoirs with references to Khronika Tekushchikh Sobitiĭ that carried 
information on the cases of all the authors in question, and in some instances influenced their 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
cases, and the fact that both men were hospitalized in the early sixties when the mechanisms for hospitalization were 
decidedly different. See Petr Grigorenko, V podpolʹe mozhno vstretitʹ tolʹko krys-- (New York: Izd-vo Detinets, 
1981); Vladimir Bukovskiĭ, I vozbrashchaetsia veter-- (New York: Khronika, 1978). Grigorenko’s account is 
available only in Russian. Bukovskiĭ’s is available in English. See To Build a Castle: My Life as a Dissenter, 
translated by Michael Scammell (New York: Viking Press, 1978). Iuriĭ Sergeevich Belov wrote about his time in a 
psychiatric hospital in Sychyovka in the later 1970s. I do not examine the work because it describes a significantly 
later period than the other memoirs in the canon. See Razmyshleniia ne tolʹko o Sychёvke: Roslavlʹ 1978. (Frankfurt: 
Posev, 1980). 
 
16
 See Novodvorskaia, Po tu storonu otchaianiia; Vladimir Bukovskiĭ, Moskovskiĭ protsess (Moscow: Izd-vo 
“MIK,” 1996); Anatoliĭ Serov, Moia sud'ba I moia bor'ba protiv psikhiatrov (Moscow: Ėkslibris-Press, 2003); 
Aleksandr Shatravka, Pobeg iz raia (New York: Liberty Publishing House, 2010); Aleksandr Avgust, Za zheltoĭ 
stenoĭ (Moscow: Izdatel'skie resheniia, 2014). 
 
17
 These special psychiatric hospitals were often, though not always (as in the case of Leningrad SPB), attached to 
prisons or camps. They were sometimes referred to as prison psychiatric hospitals (psikhiatricheskaia bol'nitsa 
tiuremnogo tipa).  
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outcome. Widely considered a reliable source that “contained real news, uncensored news, [the 
journal was compiled by] a staff of sorts that had talked with unfettered sources of information 
and that, in some cases, had directly witnessed events and freely written about them.”18 It is 
important to note that my sources are the product of men and women who participated in an 
opposition movement that advocated and practiced a “widespread commitment to truth-telling 
and not lying.”19 While I do not assume that everything they wrote was truthful, I do read their 
works with this commitment in mind. 
 The period between 1968 and 1974 is a particularly fruitful time to investigate dissident 
accounts of involuntary hospitalization because a new generation of dissidents came of age, 
influenced by the 1965 arrest and subsequent trial, in early 1966, of Iuliĭ Daniėl' and Andreĭ 
Siniavskii.
20
 This event, as well as the Soviet Union’s invasion and occupation of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, signaled “the end of de-Stalinization.”21 More active and inventive than 
the opposition of the N.S. Khrushchev era (1953-1964), this generation established KhTS in 
1968 among many other accomplishments.
22
 These years, especially the period between 1972 
and 1974, also saw increased government persecution and repression of dissent. As historian 
                                                          
18
 Mark Hopkins, Russia’s Underground Press: The Chronicle of Current Events (New York: Praeger, 1983), 21. 
For more on Khronika Tekushchikh Sobitiĭ, see Hyung-Min Joo, “Voices of Freedom: Samizdat,” Europe-Asia 
Studies 56, no. 4 (2004): 571-94; Friederike Kind-Kovacs and Jessie Labov (editors), Samizdat, Tamizdat, and 
Beyond: Transnational Media During and after Socialism (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013); Ann Komaromi, 
“Samizdat and Soviet Dissident Publics.” Slavic Review 71, no. 1 (2012): 70-90. 
For more on the factual reliability of samizdat sources, see Thomas Oleszczuk, “An Analysis of Bias in Samizdat 
Sources: A Lithuanian Case Study,” Soviet Studies 37, no. 1 (1985): 131-37. 
 
19
 Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, 77. 
 
20
 Andreĭ Donatovich Siniavskiĭ and Iuliĭ Markovich Daniėl' were arrested for publishing perceived anti-Soviet 
works abroad in a 1965-66 show trial. It was the first Soviet show trial aimed exclusively at literary crimes and 
sparked a large wave of protests both domestically and internationally. For more, see Denis Kozlov, The Readers of 
Novyi Mir: Coming to Terms with the Stalinist Past (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013): 239-62. 
 
21
 Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent, 18; Boobbyer, Conscience Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, 76. 
 
22
  Boobbyer, Conscience Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, 76. 
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Benjamin Nathans so aptly put it, “These were the years of the vilification of Andrei Sakharov 
by the Soviet press (1973), the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago and 
his expulsion from the USSR (1973-1974), and the arrest of numerous activists associated with 
the samizdat journal Chronicle of Current Events (1972-74).”23 The campaign of repression 
culminated in the temporary cessation of KhTS in 1973 and a conspicuous lull in the dissident 
movement by 1974.
24
 While dissidents proved both creative and courageous in trying to effect 
change in their relations with the state, “their main focus,” the authorities continued to enforce 
their version of the boundaries of acceptable behavior and political activity, and not 
ineffectively.
25
 Psychiatric hospitals represented a place where these two approaches intersected 
as dissidents and the state came into direct conflict. Therefore, the accounts of the patients of 
political psychiatry provide a unique insight into the relationship between the Soviet government 
and its opponents at a critical moment in history, and may help us understand how dissidents 
perceived that relationship and how they hoped to change it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Nathans, “Soviet Rights-Talk in the Post-Stalin Era,” 182. 
 
24
Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent, 28.  
 
25
 Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, 93. 
 10 
 
 
 
 
PUNISHMENT FOR WHAT? DISSIDENTS ANALYZE THEIR TRANSGRESSIONS 
Like prison sentences, fines, and other official punishments, forced confinement in 
mental institutions constituted a response to deviant behavior by demonstrating the consequences 
that would be suffered by an offending individual. Thus the authorities designed this program to 
teach both the perpetrator and society at large the consequences of unacceptable behavior. The 
difference between internment in a mental institution and more conventional punishment was 
that the authorities usually reserved the former to address infractions that were not technically 
illegal, although nonetheless unacceptable. This is especially true for transgressions resulting in a 
stay in a regular public mental hospital where in the vast majority of cases the authorities 
released dissidents after less than one year of “treatment” and usually after several months or 
less.
26
 The majority of political dissidents forced to undergo unnecessary psychiatric treatment 
endured the ordeal at a public psychiatric hospital.
27
 The Soviet authorities addressed more 
serious transgressions, including unambiguously illegal activity, by sending the guilty parties to 
special psychiatric hospitals.  
It is difficult to determine the exact number of victims Soviet political psychiatry due to 
the fact that not every case leaked onto the pages of KhTS and other samizdat journals, and few 
                                                          
26
 Medvedev, Nikolaev and Mal'tsev were all released after less than three months. 
 
27
 Under Soviet law citizens needed to be charged with a crime in order to be sent to a SPB, a decision that could be 
made only by a court. Additionally, citizens charged with a crime were not always ordered to a SPB. Some were 
hospitalized in public institutions. Although it is impossible to generate any reliable statistics with the material 
available to me, a good litmus test is the compilation Kaznimye sumasshestviem that provides short biographies of 
select victims of Soviet political psychiatry from the early 60s (with mention of one earlier case from the 50s) to 
1971. Despite focusing overwhelmingly on dissidents who were formally charged with a crime, the collection still 
lists sixteen cases of hospitalization in a public hospital compared to fourteen cases of incarceration in a SPB. See A. 
Artemova, L. Rar and M. Slavinskiĭ, compilers, Kaznimye sumasshestviem (Frankfurt: Posev, 1971). 
 
 11 
 
dissidents wrote memoirs or other accounts of their hospitalization. Dutch historian Andre 
Koppers identified 341 individuals who were hospitalized for dissent (not exclusively for 
political dissent) between the early 1960s and 1989.
28
 I do not doubt that the number of actual 
victims exceeds the concrete number of cases listed by Koppers, however, I lack the requisite 
information to suggest the realistic number of individuals forced to undergo psychiatric 
evaluation for political reasons.  
 What behavior landed Soviet citizens in these public mental institutions? In the eyes of 
Mal'tsev it was never a mystery how he ended up at the Kashchenko Psychiatric Hospital in 
Moscow on 17 October 1969, as revealed in a frank conversation with a nurse on his first day in 
the hospital: 
“Ah, newbie! Well come over here, let’s get acquainted. How did 
you end up with us?” 
“I wanted to go abroad.” 
“Ahhh, well no worries, stay with us for a little, they’ll cure you,” 
she said reassuringly. I looked at her in surprise. They will cure 
[me] of the desire to go abroad?
29
 
 
Mal'tsev’s narrative focuses on his punishment for desiring to leave for Italy, a country that he 
devoted years of his life to studying, and the inherent irony in that situation. For instance, he 
complained at an interrogation prior to his commitment, “In your opinion, anyone who leaves 
their country is abnormal? In that case, you are obligated to consider abnormal, for example, 
Lenin. Well, he left Russia.”30 However, Mal'tsev likely exaggerates the role his desire to 
immigrate to Italy played in his incarceration. As early as 1964, he wrote two letters to the 
Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union complaining About the government’s refusal to allow him to 
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emigrate and detailing his desire to forfeit his Soviet citizenship. In 1968 he penned a letter to the 
United Nations Commission for Human Rights asking them to defend his right to leave the 
country.
31
 Explaining his motivation for wishing to emigrate, he wrote: 
I want to leave this country because, as an intellectual, I find it 
impossible to go about my business here. I do not subscribe to 
official Soviet ideology, I do not believe in communism. And 
therefore, in a country where a declaration of the principles of 
communist party mindedness (kommunisnicheskoĭ partiĭnosti) in 
art is absolutely necessary, I am doomed to spiritual annihilation.
32
 
 
It is important to note that a denial of a request to emigrate was not uncommon.
33
 Additionally, 
while the sources do not provide any numbers, it can be assumed that the Supreme Soviet, 
General Secretary, and other government organs and individuals received a sizeable number of 
letters complaining about refused applications for an exit visa.
34
 It seems incredulous that the 
authorities, in this case the KGB, would detain Mal'tsev for either applying to emigrate or for 
complaining about being denied permission to emigrate. Indeed, his letters were published in 
1968 by the Soviet émigré publishing house “Novyĭ Zhurnal” and with the cooperation of 
foreign sympathizers reprinted in “a few foreign newspapers” in English and possibly other 
languages.
35
 The memoirs of Soviet citizens forcibly hospitalized in psychiatric institutions, as 
well as samizdat sources and other materials, reveal that the authorities possessed no tolerance 
for negative depictions of the Soviet Union accessible to an international audience. What was 
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acceptable (or at least tolerated) speech and behavior before a domestic audience could be 
considered activity both dangerous and detrimental to the Soviet state in front of a foreign 
audience. 
 Exposing the Soviet Union to foreign criticism, however, was not a strict prerequisite for 
involuntary hospitalization. Evgeniĭ Nikolaev’s memoir The Betrayal of Hippocrates 
(Predavshie Gippokrata) credits his internment to a history of chronic noncooperation with party 
organs and the leadership at his work place, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for 
Decontamination and Sterilization (VNIIDiS). Nikolaev, a biologist specializing in viral 
hemorrhagic fever, details a constant battle to avoid politics at his institute. He describes his 
coworkers almost as caricatures of Communist party devotees who repeatedly refute Nikolaev’s 
references to the law by citing the responsibility of every member of the institute to participate in 
“the life of the collective” and any political activity that entailed.36 His conversations with his 
superiors and colleagues along these lines proceed formulaically. First, Nikolaev provides a 
logical explanation for his refusal to participate in politics:  
Go to the subbotnik (voluntary workday) yourself, if you like it so 
much. I’m not going. The subbotnik is a communist affair, and I’m 
not a party member. It’s completely unnecessary for me to be 
there. You have the right only to invite me to the subbotnik, but 
not more than that. You have no right whatsoever to order my 
participation . . . subbotniks, like other political events, are 
supposed to be carried out voluntarily. 
 
His logical clarifications of personal philosophy and his rights under Soviet law are usually 
followed by the outraged response of his colleagues, in this case the head of Nikolaev’s 
laboratory, a certain Polezhaev: “You’re demonstrating political immaturity! Soviet power gave 
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you an education!”37 These outbursts inevitably end with an unsubtle promise of consequences. 
Polezhaev continues, “You’ve been due for a prison sentence of twenty-five years or so for a 
while now, like under Stalin. Or to be shot.”38 These events culminated in Nikolaev’s firing 
following a vote of the institute’s academic council in early September 1970.39  
 Nikolaev was not arrested until a few weeks after his firing. In the intervening period he 
began a letter writing campaign to Izvestiia, Chelovek i zakon (Man and the Law, a monthly 
journal focusing on social morals),
40
 Pravda, and other papers denouncing his unlawful firing 
and his repression by the Communists at the VNIIDiS.
41
 He also attempted to begin a legal 
campaign against the Ministry of Health—the parent organization of the VNIIDiS—visiting 
there twice between his dismissal and arrest. On 24 September 1970, the same day as his second 
appearance at the Ministry of Health, the police detained Nikolaev at 10:00 PM for questioning 
in connection with “a fight.”42 Instead, the police transported him to Moscow City Psychiatric 
Hospital no. 15.
43
 While it is likely that Nikolaev’s campaign against his illegal firing constituted 
the reason for his hospitalization, his initial conversation with the psychiatrists focused on his 
behavior at work and refusal to cooperate with Communist party organs at the institute. 
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Doctor: And why do you refuse to participate in the social life of 
the collective: you didn’t go to the communist subbotniki? Didn’t 
participate in any political classes? Didn’t select a social 
responsibility (sotsobiazatel'stvo)?
44
 Why? 
Nikolaev: All these events should be carried out voluntarily, and 
no one has the right to force me to participate in them. 
Doctor: And you consider your behavior at work to be normal? 
Nikolaev: Yes, I consider it normal.
45
 
 
Nikolaev, after the doctor disappeared, managed to read the product of his interview—a 
recommendation for his admission to the hospital: “For the last year [his] anti-Soviet feelings 
have been growing stronger. At work he ignored social-political responsibilities, mocked them. 
Fought with his colleagues. He was dismissed from his position.”46 Nikolaev claims there was no 
effort to conceal the fact that his hospitalization resulted from a violation of social norms and his 
unconcealed rejection of the Communist party. Although he violated no law, his behavior was 
unacceptable in the eyes of his superiors and the Soviet Union’s security organs.  
 The transparency displayed by the authorities is remarkable. These memoirs contain little 
discussion of formal diagnoses.
47
 Rather, the doctors and other staff proved willing to forgo any 
efforts to conceal the political reasons for the detention of these individuals in the guise of 
genuine concern over their mental health. This allowed the doctors to engage in dialogue with 
their patients regarding their political transgressions and to seek their cooperation in reaching an 
agreement with the patient regarding their future behavior. They were undoubtedly helped in 
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these efforts by the voluntary responses of Mal'tsev, Nikolaev, and others who described the 
reasons for their hospitalization as various manifestations of dissident behavior, therefore 
expressing agreement with the doctors that their political behavior was the cause for their 
commitment to an asylum, be it just or unjust in their minds. As we shall see, however, even in 
cases in which dissidents refused to volunteer reasons for why the state selected them to undergo 
a psychiatric evaluation, the authorities would usually suggest a political motivation if the 
interrogated individual declined to do so. 
 Meeting with Aleksandr Efimovich Lifshits, the head doctor of the Kaluga Psychiatric 
Hospital, located southwest of Moscow, for the first time on 29 May 1970, Zhores 
Aleksandrovich Medvedev—dissident writer and biologist and twin brother of dissident historian 
Roĭ Aleksandrovich Medvedev—suspected the incident was connected to a KGB raid on a 
friend’s apartment in February. A search of the premises resulted in the confiscation of several 
samizdat documents including the manuscript of his book International Collaboration in the 
Scientific Community and National Borders.
48
 When prompted to provide an explanation for 
why Lifshits deemed their meeting necessary, however, he simply replied, “It seems that you 
yourself should provide me with an answer to that question.”49 It did not take long for Lifshits to 
move “away from general questions of little meaning to the main business,” Zhores’s foreign 
publications.
50
 Of particular concern was a 1962 work aimed at Trofim Denisovich Lysenko, a 
Soviet biologist and agronomist responsible for the pseudoscience of “Lysenkoism” 
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(Lysenkovshchina), entitled “Biological Science and the Cult of Personality.”51 Regarding that 
publication, Lifshits commented: 
I managed to read it not long ago. It’s a polemical piece. But 
everyone forgot about Lysenko years ago, the fight over genetics is 
over. But you, instead of forgetting that episode and peacefully 
working in the laboratory, recently published your polemical work 
abroad. How do you explain that? What purpose did it 
accomplish?
52
 
 
The conversation then turned to several other manuscripts prepared by Zhores with an emphasis 
on those that he, or others, managed to publish outside the Soviet Union.  
Zhores Medvedev’s case represents another example of the USSR’s concern with actions 
that, although ostensibly legal, could embarrass the Soviet Union. Lifshits criticized 
Medevedev’s work for its lack of scientific merit. Since Lysenkoism had already been debunked, 
Lifshits described the publication as a transparent attempt to embarrass the Soviet Union by 
dwelling on past, and already resolved, mistakes. As illustrated by the examples discussed above, 
such actions included the distribution of samizdat, publication of documents abroad, or an 
attempt to proselytize against the Soviet system or Communist party in major Soviet publications 
such as Pravda or Izvestiia, as in the case of Nikolaev. Although it was impossible to publish a 
critical piece in these papers, the letters would nonetheless be read and passed on to the country’s 
security organs. While the authorities possessed no legal means of punishing these actions, 
detaining delinquent individuals under the guise of the need for a psychiatric evaluation and 
involuntarily hospitalizing them allowed the state not only the opportunity to intimidate 
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Humanity Books, 2005); Valeriĭ Soĭfer, Lysenko and the Tragedy of Soviet Science (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1994). 
 
52
Medvedev, Kto sumasshedshiĭ?, 24. 
 18 
 
offenders, but also to provide a forum where their deviant behavior could be candidly discussed 
and where dissidents could be persuaded to mind their behavior in the future. Despite the fact 
that the authorities always addressed dissidents from a position of power, mental hospitals 
became a site of negotiation between political malcontents and the authorities, where the two 
sides negotiated the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behavior. 
 
While internment in a public, “regular,” psychiatric hospital forced dissidents and others 
to endure months of hardships and deprivation of freedom, they managed to take solace in the 
fact that the authorities decided not to send them to a special psychiatric hospital where their 
situation would have been undoubtedly worse. During his first night of treatment, Mal'tsev 
consoled himself “with the thought that I had landed in Kashchenko, and not in a spetshospital, 
where they usually harass politicals. I had heard many horrible things.”53  
According to KhTS, the first SPB existed in Kazan before the German invasion of the 
Soviet Union in 1941; the exact year of its founding is unknown. Following the war, the state 
established a special “colony” for criminals suffering from psychiatric illnesses in the city of 
Sychëv in Smolensk oblast, and in 1952 a SPB opened in Leningrad (it was often referred to by 
its address, 9 Arsenal'naia street). In the late 1960s, SPBs began to proliferate with the 
establishment of new institutions in Cherniakhovsk in Kaliningrad oblast (1965), in Minsk 
(1966), and in Dnepropetrovsk (1968). 
54
 KhTS describes the psychiatrists and doctors at these 
institutions as employees of the MVD
55
, under whose jurisdiction the SPBs operated, and 
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emphasized that the staff considered the patients to be inmates. The Chronicle states that only the 
politicals and the chronically mentally ill who, in the opinion of the KGB, “presented the greatest 
danger” to society, were sent to these sites.56 
Unlike hospitalization in a public mental hospital, internment in a SPB never began 
unexpectedly with a knock on the door. Dissidents unfortunate enough to be checked into one of 
the USSR’s special psychiatric hospitals first needed to be charged with a crime.57 Once that was 
done, the state investigator could request that the accused undergo a psychiatric evaluation to 
determine whether or not he or she was “mentally competent” to stand trial and accept 
responsibility for the crime with which he or she had been charged. This did not require the 
permission of either the prosecution or defense.
58
 If the examining psychiatrists then found the 
accused to be “mentally incompetent” to stand trial, the presiding judge could exercise the option 
to send the accused to a psychiatric hospital, public or SPB, for treatment. Thus, while the 
transgressions formally spelled out in legal proceedings that resulted in dissidents being ordered 
to SPBs for compulsory treatment are unambiguous, the question of why the state decided to 
declare them mentally ill, rather than try them in court and sentence them to a more orthodox 
punishment, such as a prison sentence or hard labor, is a question worth exploring. 
Dissidents tended to speculate that commitment to a SPB spared the state any 
embarrassment that a trial could potentially provoke. “The simplest means of assuring that a 
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person does not stand trial,” wrote Natal'ia Gorbanevskaia, the founder and first editor of KhTS 
and prominent political dissident, “is to declare him mentally incompetent.”59 Reflecting on the 
process that followed the arrest of her and seven others who openly demonstrated against the 
Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia on 25 August 1968, she even stated her “surprise” that 
“they did not decide to declare all seven mentally incompetent, to declare the demonstrators ‘a 
group of crazies’: who the heck (kto zhe), besides lunatics, surrounded by shouts of unanimous 
approval will openly say ‘no.’”60 She concluded that the Soviet authorities needed some of the 
participants to stand trial “in order to preserve a degree of transparency, lawfulness, and 
openness” in their response to the protest.61 
The Soviet government possessed good reason to be wary of high profile trials of its 
political opponents. The show trials of dissidents in the late 1960s, particularly the Siniavskiĭ-
Daniėl' trial, proved to be one of the foundational influences of a new generation of Soviet 
dissidents, sometimes referred to as the “generation of 1966,”62 which demonstrated increasing 
disillusionment with the viability of the Soviet system and a willingness to openly defy it.
63
 
Nathans argues that the arrests of Sinyavskiĭ and Daniėl' marked the “transition to the civil rights 
phase of the [dissident] movement,” with thousands of individuals protesting against the arrests, 
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lack of transparency, and subsequent trial.  The subsequent round of arrests and firings suffered 
by the protesters “sparked a chain reaction of further protests, more arrests and trials, and new 
rounds of protests.”64 In contrast to cases in public psychiatric hospitals, SPBs concealed from 
the public eye cases that could spark domestic unrest or provoke the wrath of foreign public 
opinion. The state used SPBs as a means of controlling information rather than as a tool to 
persuade dissidents to reform their behavior. 
Returning to the 25 August 1968, demonstration on Red Square, there is the question of 
why, out of all the participants, the state decided to declare “incompetent” only Faĭnberg. The 
logic seems clear. The KGB agents on Red Square severely beat Faĭnberg, knocking out several 
of his front teeth.
65
 He also received a “cerebral concussion.”66 The court that declared Faĭnberg 
incompetent sat in session without him present. More than likely they had no wish to display the 
outcome of his beating. As for Gorbanevskaia, she had recently given birth, and as a result was 
released the same day as her arrest as she needed to breast feed her child.
67
 However, like 
Faĭnberg, the authorities ordered her to undergo psychiatric analysis at the Serbskiĭ Institute, the 
country’s principle center of forensic and judicial psychiatry.68 As with Faĭnberg, this decision 
demonstrates the Soviet Union’s concern with its image. The trial of a new mother was not 
something the authorities wanted to broadcast. Ultimately, the state released Gorbanevskaia with 
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the ambiguous diagnosis of “possible sluggish schizophrenia.”69 This conclusion spared the state 
the embarrassment of punishing Gorbanevskaia but provided documented medical cause to 
pursue her case in the future. Gorbanevskaia, who continued to be an important member of the 
dissident community and a prolific generator of samizdat materials, was rearrested in 1969 and 
sent to the Kazan SPB.
70
 
One discernible pattern among instances of citizens charged with crimes and declared 
incompetent is that they rarely were present during court proceedings. A declaration of mental 
incompetence would have nominally justified their absence and avoided the possibility of open 
defiance or the embarrassment of visible harm either self-inflicted or the result of beatings.
71
 
Such was the case in the trial of Leonid Pliushch.  
Leonid Ivanovich Pliushch, a mathematician and engineer employed by the Cybernetic 
Institute at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences until 1968, once dreamed of working for the 
KGB, but in the 1960s he became deeply involved in dissident activity and the human rights 
movement.
72
 Pliushch is best known for penning a letter to the newspaper Komsomol'skaia 
Pravda harshly criticizing the 1967-68 trial of fellow human rights activists Iuriĭ Timofeevich 
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Galanskov and Alexander Il'ich Ginzburg, which directly resulted in his firing, and for his 
participation in the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR.
73
 In January 
1972 the authorities arrested Pliushch and charged him under article 62 of the Criminal Code of 
the Ukrainian SSR concerning anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda with the goal of subverting 
the government.
74
 While he was in prison the court twice ordered Pliushch to undergo a 
psychiatric evaluation.
75
 The two examinations, performed respectively by the co-chairs of in-
patient forensic society at the Serbskiĭ Institute Professor Daniil Romanovich Lunts and 
Academician Andreĭ Vladimirovich Snezhnevskiĭ, resulted in a diagnosis of schizophrenia and 
chronic mental illness. In January 1973, one year after his arrest, Pliushch was charged with 
signing a critical letter sent to the United Nations as a member of the Initiative Group and 
sentenced to undergo compulsory treatment at Dnepropetrovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital.
76
  
Although Pliushch found himself at a SPB for an ostensibly medical reason, as was the 
case with Mal'tsev, Nikolaev and Medvedev, the staff never made any effort to conceal that their 
primary concern rested on his political views. His doctor, Ėlla Petrovna Kamenetskaia, after 
briefly examining him upon his arrival, commented, “No matter, we’ll soon cure [you] of your 
delusional politics.” Pliushch protested, “But you still don’t know anything about my case!” She 
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dismissively replied, “Academician Snezhnevskiĭ knows. He never makes mistakes.”77 Here 
Kamenetskaia not only is transparent in her desire to treat his political transgressions rather than 
any form of “schizophrenia,” but she also illustrates the importance of hierarchy in SPBs, by 
communicating to Pliushch that she has no interest in contradicting the findings of doctors 
holding positions in the upper echelons of the Ministry of Health, and also by stressing that 
Snezhnevskiĭ’s diagnoses were essentially orders, “He never makes mistakes.”  
Some dissidents argued that the authorities designed political psychiatry to act not only 
on individuals, but on society at large. In addition to avoiding any potential embarrassment in 
connection with forcing dissidents to stand trial, Valeriia Novodvorskaia argues that “psychiatric 
terror” served as a “weapon” to fulfill two practical goals. Writing in 1993, while running in the 
Russian legislative elections of that year, and reflecting on her own imprisonment in Kazan SPB 
for handing out poems satirically thanking the party for a number of crimes, she states that 
political psychiatry served both an international and domestic purpose for the government. 
Internationally, it “preserved the monolithic image of the Soviet people, who passionately 
believed in their leaders and ideals.” As she points out, the appearance of too many domestic 
enemies “would have blown up this conception.” But there was no need for the government to 
provide an explanation for the presence of disturbed people, “In the West there are also plenty of 
crazies.” Domestically, Novodovorskaia contends that hospitalization “discredited alternative 
ideas of societal development and the opposition in the eyes of the general population (prostoĭ 
narod).”78  
Novodovorskaia’s analysis provides a level of logic to speculation that the program was 
in place to avoid placing certain dissidents on trial. As she asserts, while the West had cause to 
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protest the lack of political liberties—present in their own nations—it would be ridiculous to 
suggest that the USSR was the only nation that committed the mentally ill. This program also did 
help to preserve the integrity and centrality of Communist party ideals. While alternatives to 
communism may have appealed to a percentage of the Soviet population, people are naturally 
much less likely to perceive the ideas of mental patients as credible. 
Although Public and Special Psychiatric Hospitals served different purposes, it is 
possible to see similarities between the two institutions. They both aimed to stifle political 
opposition, to guard the international reputation of the USSR, and to discredit challenges to the 
primacy of communism and the Communist party. To this end, the staff at both types of 
institutions displayed a willingness to discuss dissidents’ political views and actions without the 
disguise of medical treatment or necessity.
79
 However, “treatment” proceeded differently at the 
two categories of hospital. What were these differences? How did doctors at public mental 
institutions and SPBs hope to act on and influence dissidents in their charge? What strategies did 
dissidents employ to mitigate their hardship? An examination of the discussion of daily life and 
treatment in memoir accounts helps to reveal the goals of psychiatric treatment of political 
dissent, as well as the methods for accomplishing those objectives, in the eyes of dissidents 
subjected to involuntary hospitalization. 
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IN THE MENTAL WARD: NEGOTIATIONS, IDENTITY, AND PSYCHIATRIC 
VIOLENCE 
 The Soviet Union’s program of punitive psychiatry served as the site of some of the only 
prolonged and direct contact between dissidents and the state. While similar interaction between 
political oppositionists and authorities took place in prisons and camps, the relations between the 
two sides in public psychiatric hospitals constituted a dialogue, shaped by power relations 
between the two sides and a hierarchy of authority. Therefore, each side sought to negotiate from 
a position of strength. This is a prominent theme in dissident accounts. 
 In the eyes of dissidents interred in public mental institutions, doctors saw their purpose 
as addressing unacceptable, although legal, behavior, and ensuring that the individuals in 
question acknowledged and agreed to abide by the boundaries of acceptable political behavior in 
the future. Unlike the GULAG system and other Stalinist forms of punishment that endeavored 
to provoke a “spiritual change” in the minds of its opponents and win them over to communism, 
punitive psychiatry primarily addressed conspicuous behavior and displayed little regard for 
changing dissidents’ disposition toward the Communist party.80 In this regard the hospital staff 
aimed to provoke a superficial change. Soliciting their patients’ cooperation, the public 
psychiatric hospital became the setting for a prolonged negotiation between the state and 
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committed political dissidents, although the authorities always possessed far more chips with 
which to negotiate.  
 The first step in the process of negotiations was always the “arrest” and involuntary 
commitment of the individual. This show of force reminded the arrestee that the authorities 
determined how the law operated and that the increasingly popular “legalist” philosophy of 
dissent that stressed interpreting Soviet law literally and holding the authorities accountable to it, 
would not serve them well while under psychiatric supervision.
81
 Doctors and police brushed off 
any mentions of the unlawfulness of the arrests and commitments. Iuriĭ Mal'tsev interrogated the 
head doctor at Kashchenko upon his arrival: 
“If I am not mistaken,” I said, “According to the law you can only 
involuntarily commit ill people with violent tendencies, who 
present a danger to those around them.” 
“You are mistaken,” he said.82 
 
The police similarly rebuffed Zhores Medvedev’s assumptions. Refusing to take his place in the 
police car summoned to escort him to a psychiatric evaluation, Medvedev chastised the officer 
for forcibly entering his home, “If you are a police major, you should know the laws about the 
sanctity of a citizen’s domicile. After all, the police are an organ of security, order, and 
lawfulness.” The major answered, “We are an organ of force!” and even “slammed his fist into 
his chest.”83 While keen to establish that they acted from a position of power, the tone of the 
authorities softened dramatically once “treatment” actually began. 
 Dissidents believed their commitment was connected to their political activities. And 
even in the case of some, such as Zhores Medvedev, who refused to offer an explanation for their 
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supposed “illness,” doctors did not hesitate to steer their interrogation in a political direction. 
Thus, from the start, both doctors and patients accepted political deviance as the reason for the 
dissidents’ hospitalization. Importantly, by volunteering political explanations for their 
compulsory psychiatric evaluations, dissidents participated in their diagnosis. In these instances 
both parties agreed that the patients’ dissident activities were the reason they “required” 
psychiatric treatment. Thus, the diagnosis appears mutual, rather than unilaterally decided by the 
state. In the case of Zhores Medvedev, the state went one step further in order to ensure his 
complicity in his treatment. The head doctor of Kaluga Psychiatric Hospital A. E. Lifshitz 
appeared at his apartment accompanied by several police officers and suggested that it was in 
Medvedev’s best interests to “voluntarily appear for a psychiatric evaluation.”84 Although he 
refused, it is clear that, from the beginning stages of the process of committing dissidents, the 
state sought cooperation from its political opponents and strived to cultivate an image of acting 
in concert with them as opposed to one-sidedly working against them. 
 The staff of public psychiatric hospitals in the Soviet Union possessed a number of means 
of encouraging dissidents to cooperate. Their greatest tool in that regard was time. Only a 
commission of three doctors, usually chaired by a representative of the Serbskiĭ Instititure, held 
the power to discharge patients. Deterioration or even lack of improvement in an individual’s 
“condition” could lead to a prolonged stay at the hospital if the presiding doctors believed that 
releasing the patient was not in his interests.
85
 Therefore, it behooved patients to cultivate the 
impression that treatment was positively affecting their “illness,” especially since, unlike prison 
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or camp sentences that are completed after a set period of time, hospitalization could be 
indefinite.   
Although Soviet law mandated that involuntarily committed patients be evaluated by a 
panel of three doctors within twenty-four hours after their hospitalization, this meeting often did 
not take place until weeks after an individual’s commitment. Citing Legal Regulations on Public 
Health,
86
 the first issue of KhTS reported that although, “upon arrival at the hospital within 
twenty-four hours the individual should be examined by a commission of three people,” that did 
not occur in the case of [Aleksandr Sergeevich Esenin-] Vol'pin, nor in the case of 
Gorbanevskaia.”87 In fact, of the sources I examined, with the exception of Zhores Medvedev’s 
case, there is not a single mention of any of these dissidents meeting with a commission within 
twenty-four hours of their arrival. Mal'tsev and some of his fellow patients even compared the 
delay in his hearing to Samuel Becket’s play Waiting for Godot, the implication being that 
“Professor Godot” would never arrive.88 However, the authorities typically subjected 
malcontents to hospital life for one to three to four months. This provided dissidents with a taste 
of what could result from future transgressions, and as people who now possessed a record of 
psychiatric treatment, they could easily be recommitted at the state’s pleasure.89 
 Dissident accounts of their period of confinement agree the authorities hoped to find 
common ground with their patients and that their daily life was loosely structured and relatively 
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comfortable. Zhores Medvedev refers to this as “the liberal period” of hospitalization, during 
which the staff allowed patients to receive guests, including other well-known political 
dissidents, and also allowed them access to the hospital library, television room, film screenings, 
and other privileges.
90
 The doctors likewise tried to make the impression that they considered 
themselves on the same side as their patients and used the various privileges at their disposal in 
an attempt to generate a rapport with their subjects. 
 Managing to meet with a doctor, Konstantin Maksimovich, on his second day at the 
hospital, Iuriĭ Mal'tsev recounted the psychiatrist’s surprise at the fact the staff had initially 
settled his charge in the “loud ward”91 of the hospital. He promised Mal'tsev an immediate 
transfer to the “peaceful ward,” as the doctor already ascertained that he was a man of “sound 
judgment (zdravomysliashchiĭ).” He further assured Mal'tsev that he believed there were no 
political motivations behind his hospitalization, and he saw no obvious signs of mental illness in 
him, “But, you understand, I don’t decide that question alone.”92 This deferential behavior is 
notable. There was a concrete effort to be friendly with dissident-patients, possibly in part 
because both doctor and patient considered themselves members of the intelligentsia and 
therefore comrades of a sort, but undoubtedly the efforts of doctors to solicit cooperation played 
a role in the respect they showed to patients. It also speaks to power relations, as patients such as 
Mal'tsev, despite being suspect, still legally retained their political rights and as such needed to 
be handled politely and could not be treated as a prisoner.  
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Such polite relationships contrasted sharply with the treatment the staff displayed toward 
the genuinely and seriously mentally ill. Mal'tsev recounted the “treatment” one attendant 
handed out to a Tartar who refused to stop shouting in the middle of the night: “I thought that 
you were a person, but turns out you are a piece of shit. Now you’re going to get a shot of 
sulfozinum,” (a sulfur based drug used exclusively in Soviet psychiatry and famous for its 
painful side effects).
93
 Dissidents in psychiatric hospitals found themselves suspended 
somewhere in between the world of the doctors and the chaos of the “loud ward.” The fact that 
the doctors controlled which world they found themselves in took a psychological toll on many 
dissidents, leading them to believe that even if it was vile to them to cooperate, they possessed 
no choice in the matter. Mal'tsev chose to cooperate. During his exit interview, he made it clear 
that he decided to do so solely for pragmatic purposes: 
“Tell us, have you now abandoned your idea of leaving the 
country?” 
“I’ve dismissed that idea as unrealistic and impractical,” I 
answered. 
“But you would still like to go to Italy, isn’t that so?” 
“Of course. It’s the completely natural desire of a person who 
dedicated many years of his life to the study of Italian language 
and Italian culture.”94 
The medical service colonel conducting the interview dismissed Mal'tsev without further 
comment on the subject.
95
 Mal'tsev was discharged from Kashchenko on 18 October 1969, one 
month and one day after his admission to the hospital. 
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 Another tool at the disposal of the authorities was their manipulation of the daily routine 
of life in a psychiatric hospital. Following a schedule prescribed by the authorities—when to eat, 
when to sleep, what pills to take, etc.—demonstrated an ability and willingness to cooperate with 
the state even if not all patients demonstrated awareness of that scenario. Judging by Evgeniĭ 
Nikolaev’s account of his first hospitalization at Moscow City Hospital no. 15, his tendency 
toward insubordination and his unwillingness to cooperate with Communist party organs 
weakened his confinement. Despite standing his ideological ground, Nikolaev generally followed 
the instructions of his doctors and nurses, took (or at least feigned taking) the pills prescribed to 
him, and “always” voluntarily attended hospital cultural outings (kul'tpokhody). Even though he 
claimed to do so only owing to a lack of anything better to do and because of the rare chance to 
escape the hospital grounds, this behavior nonetheless marked a conspicuous retreat from his 
outright refusal to participate in subbotniki and other cultural programs at the VNIIDiS.
96
 
Following four months at the hospital, the staff deemed Nikolaev’s progress sufficient enough to 
release him, but designated him a “type II invalid” for one year to prevent him from working and 
ordered him to maintain certain routines including taking prescribed medicine and keeping 
regular appointments at a treatment center (dispanser).
97
  
Upon his release his doctor, Liudmila Grigor'evna, reminded Nikolaev, in no uncertain 
terms, that his release was conditional: 
Taking your medicine is compulsory. Visiting the treatment center 
is compulsory. And don’t even think about expressing your 
political views anywhere. Otherwise you’ll again be committed to 
a psychiatric hospital. And don’t complain to any person or place. I 
read your complaint to the administration of the institute on the 
subject of your dismissal from work. They can also commit you to 
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a hospital for such complaints. I likewise advise you not to practice 
politics in order to avoid future visits to the hospital.
98
 
 
Here, the doctor’s admission not only served as an attempt to influence Nikolaev’s future 
behavior, but also constituted a power play—the authorities could, and were willing to, use 
psychiatry to address political dissent even if such dissent was permitted by the constitution of 
the Soviet Union. The fact that Liudmila Grigor'evna admitted as much to Nikolaev suggests that 
the Soviet Union’s abuse of psychiatry was an open secret. 
As Nikolaev himself would later discover, this was not unfounded advice.
99
 The 
authorities could deprive a former mental patient of his freedom ad infinitum as long as he 
continued to violate the boundaries of acceptable behavior. Although the doctors refused to 
inform Mal'tsev of his diagnosis, he convinced a nurse to communicate it to him, “Psychopathy. 
Keep under observation of the district psychiatrist.” He came to a similar conclusion as Liudmila 
Grigor'evna, “It means, that going forward any given day they can once again lock me up in a 
mental hospital.”100 The potential for future hospitalization thus acted as a check on dissidents’ 
behavior after they left the controlled environment of the hospital. 
 A number of dissidents were morally opposed to cooperating with the psychiatric organs 
to which the state subjected them. As Boobbyer asserts, dissidents of the late 1960s and 1970s 
were guided by the principal “that the consequences of people’s actions should not be the 
ultimate guide for their behavior, but that conscience was a superior arbiter.” 101 Dissidents 
viewed political psychiatry as especially heinous because it attempted to eliminate their right to a 
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conscience, to destroy their individuality. Valeriia Novodvorskaia evocatively summarized this 
perspective: 
Psychiatric terror is an absolute victory for evil. If you yield, they 
break you. There is no individuality. If you resist, they will destroy 
your individuality chemically or mechanically (say electrically 
[shock therapy]). And there can be no victory because no 
individuality remains: victory can be celebrated only when there is 
a PERSON (komu) to celebrate it.”102 
 
Dissidents expressed real concern over preserving their ethics, morals, and individuality and 
often refused to compromise them even in the case of intense hardship. As Nathans points out, 
there is a conspicuous absence of “dissident text[s] criticizing either the theory or practice of the 
USSR’s elaborate system of socialist rights guaranteed by the state.” 103 Dissidents believed they 
were fighting for rights entitled to them under Soviet law. Esenin-Vol'pin describing how the 
paramedic who escorted him to Moscow City Psychiatric Hospital no. 5, advised him not to 
voice his principles and to cooperate with the doctors, conceded, “I considered his advice 
completely practical.” However he also found it to be “wishy-washy (presmykatel'skim),” and 
proudly remarked, “I always avoided following that type of advice and did so very 
transparently.”104  
 Victor Feĭnberg even refused to feign cooperation as a formality to expedite his 
previously agreed upon release and emigration to Israel, the result of a prolonged hunger strike 
that endangered his life and sparked widespread domestic and international outrage. After his 
transfer from the Leningrad SPB to the Fifth Civil Mental Hospital, a public institution, the 
doctors there informed Feĭnberg that they planned on advocating for his release, but in order to 
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do so they needed to demonstrate “an improvement in his condition.” This required 
demonstrating “a course of treatment.” “They then asked me to choose my own treatment, 
offering to prescribe any drugs I liked. They even offered to throw away the drugs as long as it 
could be said that I had a course of treatment. I refused all these offers.” “He can’t be bent,” his 
wife told them. Eventually they abandoned efforts to solicit his help “and did their best to get rid 
of me.”105 Feĭnberg’s threat of a second hunger strike,106 which the doctors believed could result 
in his death, convinced the KGB to consent to his expedited release.
107
 More often than not, 
however, noncooperation resulted in extended hospitalization. 
Zhores Medvedev never managed to cultivate the type of superficially friendly 
relationship with his doctors the way Mal'tsev and Konstantin Maksimovich did or even the 
begrudging mutual tolerance Nikolaev and Liudmila Grigor'evna showed to each other. 
Although Dr. Lifshits provided him with the impression that the hospital wished to hold 
Medvedev for a minimum amount of time—three days—he claimed that he was unwilling to 
compromise his integrity in order to ensure his quick discharge. Greeting the commission with 
the defiant words, “the masquerade is over,” he “attempted to calmly answer” a number of 
questions about his work that had been published abroad, as well as various incidents at his 
places of work spanning back as far as five years previous.
108
 He repeated the exercise with a 
larger commission two days later. In both cases he insisted that he committed no illegal 
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actions.
109
 His unacceptable answers, coupled with his repeated violations of the hospital 
regiment, convinced the commission to detain Zhores Medvedev at the hospital.
110
 Thus, Lifshits 
demonstrated that, while he could not force Medvedev to cooperate, he possessed the authority to 
detain the dissident as long as he continued to prove unwilling to engage in any meaningful 
dialogue. 
Although Medvedev claimed that his treatment became increasingly harsh, he makes no 
mention of violence or psychical abuse or even an unnecessary course of treatment. Rather, he 
asserts that the conversations with doctors became franker and they stopped veiling their threats: 
“What sparked Solzhenitsyn’s111 problems?” Bondareva [(another 
doctor at Kaluzhskaia Psychiatric Hospital, first and patronymic 
unknown)] asked suddenly. 
“What does that have to do with me?” I answered with a question. 
“Oh don’t start (chto vy), I’m asking not as a doctor, I’m simply 
asking.”112 
 
About a week before his discharge, the administration bluntly warned Medvedev, as Liudmila 
Grigor'evna had cautioned Nikolaev, to discontinue his political delinquency: “You should 
completely quit the practice of publishing and concentrate your attention on scientific work. If 
you continue that activity, you will inevitably end up with us again.”113 By 17 June 1970, the day 
of Medvedev’s release, the situation had changed dramatically. A shaken and apologetic Dr. 
Lifshits shook Medvedev’s hands and begged him above all “not to write any notes about [his] 
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time in the Kaluga hospital.
114
 Zhores credited his sudden release to the efforts of his brother Roĭ 
to campaign on his behalf, highlighting an important element of the negotiations between 
dissidents and the state.  
 Dissidents, even in psychiatric hospitals, were not powerless against state repression. The 
dramatic turn in events in the case of Zhores Medvedev was the result of three weeks of 
coordinated efforts to secure his release spearheaded by his twin brother Roĭ. Responsible for 
half of the chapters in the co-written memoir, Kto sumasshedshiĭ?, Roĭ initiated a public 
awareness campaign and mobilized a number of prominent dissidents to call for Zhores’s release. 
Balancing his protest activities with frequent visits to the hospital, Roĭ informed a wide circle of 
people, including his brother’s acquaintance and famed Soviet nuclear physicist and human 
rights activists Andreĭ Dmitrievich Sakharov, who began writing letters and signing petitions.115 
Roĭ also attempted to draw international attention to the case, at one point, along with Sakharov, 
targeting an international symposium on molecular genetics, where foreigners would be present, 
at the Institute of Genetics of the Soviet Academy of Science. Roĭ entered the hall where all the 
participants were already present and wrote in large letters on the blackboard: “A.D. Sakharov is 
in the auditorium collecting signatures to protest the internment of Zhores Medvedev in a 
psychiatric hospital.”116 Roĭ credits a widely circulated letter sent by Sakharov to Brezhnev 
calling for Zhores’s immediate release as the key to the protest.117  
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Over the next week the hospital was bombarded with telegrams and letters defending 
Zhores. These items “unnerved Lifshits.”118 Bondareva initially attempted to ignore them, 
arguing that it was not possible for him to have so many close acquaintances from the cultural 
and scientific elite and declared her intention of retaining him for a few more months.
119
 Barely 
ten days after Sakharov’s letter was distributed, however, the hospital agreed to discharge him.  
Lifshits and Bondareva wished Zhores the best of luck, ensured him that their concerns were 
purely medical, and that “for them the interest of patients was the highest concern.”120 The 
Medvedev brothers’ odyssey underlines the fact that dissidents possessed means of pressuring 
doctors and the state. Receiving daily letters of protests from household names intimidated 
doctors and likely forced them to consider whether retaining their patient was in their best 
interests. For the state security services, the benefits of hospitalizing one dissident were likely 
outweighed by the threat of an organized protest movement. Political psychiatry contained many 
elements of negotiation. Some dissidents managed to win the day by speaking from a position of 
greater power than their doctors—however, this was not usually the case and it is difficult to 
determine how representative Medvedev’s experience is. 
Zhores Medvedev was not the only dissident to credit his release to the intervention of 
third parties. Mal'tsev noted that the administration permitted him to see visitors, including the 
well-known dissidents Petr Iakir and Iuliĭ Kim.121 He recounted that after their meeting one of 
them ran into a foreign journalist and his situation became known to the general secretary of the 
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European Community of Writers (COMES), Giancarlo Vigorelli.
122
 Within a few days the 
doctors were shaking his hand, addressing the wannabe émigré as “comrade,” and the 
bureaucratic procedures necessary for his discharge had been set in motion.
123
 Likewise, 
returning to work after his release,
 124
 Nikolaev’s coworkers informed him that his case had been 
mentioned in KhTS and the samizdat journal Posev, and had been widely discussed.
125
 These 
three cases illustrate the power of publicity and international pressure to influence the state’s 
treatment of hospitalized dissidents. They also show that even in psychiatric hospitals, these 
considerations gave dissidents the ability to negotiate from a position of power if they cultivated 
the right connections, in some cases securing their release despite making no, or minimal, 
concessions, to the hospital administration regarding their political activities. This not only 
suggests substantial limits on the state’s ability to control information and enforce the country’s 
unwritten rules of political behavior, but also vindicates the government’s fear of the dissident 
movement.  
Special Psychiatric Hospitals operated significantly differently. Their task was the long-
term treatment and observation of violent and criminally inclined mental patients. This is 
evidenced by Leonid Pliushch’s language in Na karnavale istorii. He refers not to patients, but to 
inmates and prisoners. Guards are interchangeable with doctors, nurses, and orderlies in his 
account. Doctors, in Pliushch’s narrative, contrary to their comparatively friendly counterparts at 
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public institutions, acted like commandants of a concentration camp. The patients even 
nicknamed Pliushch’s first doctor, Ėlla Petrovna, Ilse Koch.126 Although Pliushch argues that the 
hospital’s most feared doctor, Nina Nikolaevna Bochkovskaia, was worthier of that moniker,127 
he depicts the latter as an unsympathetic sadist who interacted with patients only in order to dole 
out punishments. He recounted one of her typical appearances: 
She rushed into the ward and in a cold, lifeless voice said: 
“Petrov, you were swearing at the nurse again! Sulfates [sera]!” 
“Ivanov, they say that you were masturbating.” 
“And are there more dirty rumors about you, Sidorov?”  
To everyone [she ordered] “New doses of antipsychotics 
(neĭroleptikov)”.128 
 
Unlike in public mental hospitals, drugs were frequently used to punish politicals or otherwise to 
encourage them to cooperate. The staff as a whole proved unsympathetic to all patients, although 
politicals and genuine criminals (vory)—usually fakers trying to temporarily escape the prison 
next to the hospital, perceiving the conditions in the “madhouse” as preferable to those in prison 
proper—were generally afforded better treatment than the genuinely disturbed.129 One fellow 
patient warned Pliushch, “Everything’s mayhem here (that is complete unlawfulness). If you 
start to fuck with the doctors, nurses, or orderlies, you’re finished. They’ll kill [you] with 
medicine, the orderlies will beat [you] and not let [you] go to the bathroom. All politicals bite 
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their tongues (pomalkivaiut), and you should too.”130 In contrast to their public counterparts, the 
SPBs proved a living hell. 
 Patients possessed good reason to keep a low profile. The drugs prescribed at the hospital 
to politicals varied: “to some they give lighter ones, to others a little harder. Just hope they don’t 
give [you] haloperidol or thioproperazine (mazheptil).”131 The inhabitants of the hospital 
frequently witnessed the side effects of these drugs and quickly learned to fear them, especially 
haloperidol.  In his memoir, Pliushch writes: “I see the effect of haloperidol on the inmates in 
quarantine. One is suffering convulsions, writhing all over. Unable to lie down, he stands up. His 
head twisted to the side, his eyes bulged. A second is panting, sticking out his tongue. A third is 
shouting, calling the nurse, asking for an antidote—medicine to combat the physical effects of 
haloperidol.” Pliushch notes, “It became clear that they give out so much haloperidol in order to 
instill fear, weaken the will to resist, and expose the fakers.”132 Pliushch portrays himself and his 
fellow prisoners as victims of psychiatric abuse and a regime of terror. In Dnepropetrovsk SPB 
the staff possessed all the power. Any breaking of the rules, including suicide attempts, were 
answered with beatings in addition to drugs.
133
 His portrayal suggests that ultimately the only 
way to survive this living hell was, as his fellow captive suggested, to bite your tongue. 
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 Yet even among murderers and rapists, the staff considered politicals to be especially 
dangerous.
134
 They treated them cautiously, taking careful measures to ensure that they could not 
continue dissident activities within the mental ward. Unlike in public mental hospitals, the 
authorities in SPBs demonstrated a greater awareness of the potential for inmates to convey 
information to the outside world and this in turn could be used to pressure the Soviet government 
to release them—as in the case of Mal'tsev and Medvedev. Pliushch suggests that he escaped 
punitive doses of sulfates or haloperidol only because the administration feared his wife, who 
was allowed to visit Pliushch for the first time only during his sixth month at the hospital, and 
her potential to use any information about his treatment.
135
 Nonetheless, he still suffered 
prescribed doses of a number of antipsychotics.
136
 The staff also exercised a policy of separating 
politicals from one another, although in practice this was not always possible, and also 
discouraged other patients from associating with “socially dangerous” people such as Pliushch. 
He maintains that the doctors prescribed higher doses of haloperidol to inmates he engaged in 
regular conversation with as a means of discouraging them from socializing with him.
137
 
Additionally, Pliushch complains of being frequently moved from ward to ward (some notorious 
for harsher treatment, others for being more relaxed). He reasons that these moves were not 
designed to punish or reward his behavior, but rather were the consequence of the movement of 
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other politicals.
138
 If another dissident was sent to his ward, the staff needed to move Pliushch 
elsewhere.
139
 
 Pliushch’s representation of the hospital environment and policies suggests that both the 
state and the SPB authorities feared politicals. Perceiving dissidents as a volatile element in a 
controlled environment, the staff expressed anxiety over their potential to conspire, and thus 
endeavored to separate politicals. It appears that doctors also worried about the ability of 
dissidents to pollute the minds of other patients with their “detrimental politics,” and strived to 
separate them from the hospital’s “anti-Soviet” patients.140 As a result, politicals became a pariah 
caste within SPBs, isolated and handled with caution. This is reflected by the attitudes of nurses 
and doctors. Nurses complained that politicals were “yids, anti-Soviet and prevented the other 
patients from recovering.”141 Even some fellow patients, usually the genuinely mentally ill, 
occasionally berated Pliushch for his oppositionist politics (although he notes that “almost all the 
patients are on good terms with politicals and the majority of orderlies as well”).142 While he 
portrays most doctors at the institute as universally cruel regardless of their personal politics, he 
says of the doctor assigned to his case, Liudmila Alekseevna Liubarskaia, “she was not a sadist, 
just an idiot.  She sincerely believed that a person who was throwing away his career, who was 
bringing hardship upon himself and his family, a mathematician who practices politics, is not 
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right in the head. ”143 Pliushch thus suggests that the medical staff believed dissidents 
represented a social danger and displayed no reluctance to treat them. 
 How did doctors attempt to neutralize their especially dangerous dissident-patients? First, 
doctors expressed a desire to keep dissidents in SPBs indefinitely. Pliushch argues that the 
medical staff interacted with him, scrutinized his letters, and monitored his behavior in an 
attempt to fish for symptoms of behavior that could be interpreted as a sign of mental illness. For 
example, Pliushch maintained his relationship with his son by writing fairytales and sending 
them to him because the boy requested that his father send him some stories. Ėlla Petrovna 
suggested this was indicative of infantilism and that “it could become good material for the 
history of [his] disease.”144 Pliushch was well aware of the fact that doctors could use virtually 
any of his behavior or written or spoken words to document “symptoms.” Interestingly, during 
Pliushch’s pretrial period spent in the custody of the Kiev KGB, his cellmate was a psychiatrist 
by profession, Feliks Lifshits. Lifshits advised him that his answers to the inquiries of 
psychiatrists should be “balanced”: “You can’t be cheerful, you can’t be downcast. You can’t be 
logical, you can’t be illogical.” But in response to Pliushch’s inquiry, “Well, isn’t too much 
‘balance’ also abnormal?” Feliks conceded, “It’s possible.”145 Despite the fact that Pliushch 
describes inventing symptoms as an easy task, he acknowledges that the doctors, above all Nina 
Nikolaevna, proved talented masters of constructing an objectively convincing case for mental 
illness in politicals. “[She] studied my letters well and learned my weak points, and therefore 
occasionally succeeded in provoking me into an emotional outburst.”146 Therefore, doctors 
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scrutinized patients for behavior that could be portrayed as symptomatic of their disease, but also 
attempted to draw flashes of anger, and other demonstrative reactions, out of them in order to 
bolster the hospital’s case for further treatment, and custody, of their political inmates. The 
hospitals had no wish to release such dangerous elements back into society. 
 SPBs, in Pliushch’s narrative, also served the interests of the Soviet Union’s security 
agencies. Pliushch claims that his doctors frequently mined him for information on samizdat and 
other dissidents. He states that he steadfastly refused to provide any information, “Are you an 
investigator or a doctor? I’ll answer medical questions, but not investigative ones.” However, the 
doctors insisted that cooperation with some inquiries was the only way to secure freedom, “You 
will answer all of our questions, if you want to get out of here.”147 The promise of freedom or 
other concessions, such as a temporary escape from drugs, in exchange for information proved a 
tempting offer for some politicals, although an impressive number of them assert that they 
refused to give out any useful intelligence. Pliushch notes that visits from the KGB inevitably 
followed a productive interrogation and such appearances were not uncommon.
148
 Thus, there is 
evidence of an element of negotiation and dialogue in SPBs, but the power dynamic behind them 
were clearly far less malleable than in public psychiatric hospitals. 
Pliushch mentions that each confession by a fellow political was a blow to his moral. 
None more so than the capitulation of Viktor Aleksandrovich Krasin and Petr Ionovich Iakir, 
founding members of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights alongside Pliushch 
and others. Following their arrest in 1972 they cracked under pressure and provided the KGB 
with an enormous amount of information about KhTS and samizdat in general. At their trial they 
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publically confessed to anti-Soviet activity and recanted, sparking one of the most “difficult 
moments for the human rights movement, and the Chronicle ceased to appear for a while.”149 
Pliushch recounts that the impact of their actions on politicals cannot be overstated. Listening to 
Iakir and Krasin’s “deceitful confession” over the radio, “All of us politicals were blown away 
by their Judas-like words. Many couldn’t think, couldn’t speak.”150 From Pliushch’s reaction it is 
clear that breaking prisoners served a double purpose for the state, not only providing them with 
valuable intelligence but also a weapon to lower the morale of the dissident movement as a 
whole. Iakir and Krasin’s surrender forced Pliushch to question his faith in the human rights 
movement and fellow politicals, “I thought that [Iakir] would sooner kill himself then betray his 
friends.”151 It was the low point of the dissident movement under Brezhnev. 
 How did dissidents react to this seemingly hopeless situation? Initially encouraged by 
stories he heard of earlier dissidents in SPBs, “very brave people,” Pliushch’s romanticized ideal 
of resistance to the bitter end was spoiled by conversations with fellow dissidents: “The politicals 
advised me to concede my insanity and repent [my anti-Soviet actions] (just not in writing).”152 
As Russian literature scholar Rebeca Reich points out, a diverse group of dissidents employing 
different approaches to their involuntary hospitalization all concluded that “those examined for 
political reasons were unlikely to alter their fate.”153  
Prominent Russian dissident Vladimir Bukovskiĭ’ and Ukrainian dissident and 
psychiatrist Semën Gluzman formulated an approach to navigating the lawlessness and constant 
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behavioral scrutiny of institutional political psychiatry in their co-written piece, “A Manual on 
Psychiatry for Dissidents.” Bukovskiĭ and Gluzman designed the “Manual,” completed in 1974, 
as a handbook for dissidents enduring compulsory psychiatric “treatment.” Originally published 
in the samizdat journal Khronika zashchity prav v SSSR in 1975 and dedicated to “Leonid 
Pliushch, a victim of psychiatric terror,” the manual advised dissidents that their best chance of 
escape was to feign mental illness and suggest that Soviet psychiatry was successfully curing 
them.
154
 A gradual demonstration of the adoption of correct political views and an improvement 
in symptoms (i.e. a disavowal of past dissident activity) served as the only means of receiving a 
discharge from a SPB, “In that and only in that is their hope of escape.”155 As Gluzman later 
stated, “Our text is frightening . . . precisely because it shows that it was impossible to defend 
oneself within this system of legal coordinates.”156 Thus, many dissidents in psychiatric hospitals 
realized that in order to ensure their freedom they needed to reach an agreement with the 
authorities and work within the parameters of a broken system. 
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CONCLUSION: THE METHOD TO THEIR MADNESS 
 
 Why were these memoir accounts written? A close examination of these texts reveals a 
universal disillusionment with the Soviet system, in contrast to the dissident movement of the 
Khrushchev era that focused on reforming the system. It was beyond reform in the eyes of 
Brezhnev era oppositionists.
157
 As Philip Boobbyer asserts, the intellectuals of the Brezhnev 
period “saw the state as alien and predatory.”158  
 Zhores and Roĭ Medvedev’s work privileged the theme of the revival of repression by 
highlighting the lawlessness of the current regime and by showing its dysfunctional attributes. 
They do so in two ways. First, by emphasizing his doctors’ interest in his expose of Lysenko, 
Zhores links the Stalinist era repression of ideologically incorrect scientific theories to his own 
persecution under Brezhnev. Second, Medvedev highlights the inability of the Soviet Union to 
function, according to its own laws. This theme runs throughout the work, from the policeman 
who claimed to represent “an instrument of force,” rather than “organ of security, order, and 
lawfulness,” to the numerous doctors, KGB agents, and others who allowed a sane man to be 
forcibly hospitalized.
159
 
 Leonid Pliushch criticized the Brezhnev regime by depicting it as soulless and devoid of 
human values. He favors comparisons to Nazism and concentration camps over allusions to the 
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Stalin era as evidence by his frequent mention of the nickname “Isla Koch” that the prisoners 
applied to their female doctors. He argues that the Gestapo “influenced and inspired” the KGB 
“in brandishing the art of torture.”160 Pliushch gives additional power to this theme by recounting 
his conversation with fellow politicals who advised him to agree with any diagnosis and keep a 
low profile. He portrays a dissident community that viewed itself as largely powerless to stand 
up to the state that imprisoned them. 
What Horvath writes about Solzhenitsyn can be applied to these accounts as well: they 
“confront the reader with routine dehumanization.”161 This is accomplished by implicitly 
showing that, if a person challenged the Soviet system through behavior, writing, or other 
conspicuous mediums the state did not consider him mentally competent. This theme is present 
not only in the authors’ descriptions of the confines of psychiatric hospitals, but also in events 
preceding the authors’ hospitalization. For example, Nikolaev’s claim that his institute refused to 
give serious weight to his scientific work because he refused to go to subbotniki and participate 
in the collective life of his workplace demonstrates everyday consequences for refusing to 
subscribe to official ideology.
162
 Perhaps an even more powerful example is Zhores Medvedev’s 
description of Dr. Lifshitz’s appearance at his apartment and demand that he appear voluntarily 
at Kaluga hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, in essence a request that he voluntarily participate 
in his own repression.
163
 These accounts succeed in creating an image of an authoritarian 
political system that would have reminded their audience of the Stalin era.  
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These works also protest the nature of power relations in the Brezhnev era. While 
Medvedev’s and Mal'tsev’s claims that protest activity and foreign pressure helped to expedite 
their discharge suggest that dissidents possessed some means of pressuring the state, the works 
collectively suggest a grim future for Soviet dissidents. Leonid Pliushch’s especially disturbing 
account, along with Bukovskiĭ and Gluzman’s manual for dissenters in psychiatric hospitals, 
shows that, once charged with a crime, politicals saw little hope for altering their situation other 
than capitulation. In the late 1960s and early 1970s dissidents viewed themselves as a weak, 
albeit determined, movement with little realistic prospect of forcing any significant change in an 
increasingly repressive state. 
The authors of these works claim that the system lacked any true believers. For instance, 
Mal'tsev’s Reportazh iz sumasshedshogo doma, emphasizes the absurdity of the Soviet system 
and failings of communism. He portrays his hospitalization as an elongated comedy—a type of 
charade that all the actors participate in, but that fails to fool anyone. Pliushch notes that even his 
mother, a devoted Communist who previously wrote to the KGB “that I was up to no good,” lost 
faith in the system when she visited him at the Dnepropetrovsk SPB. He recounts, “Finally my 
mother understood what Soviet power really is. Never before had she believed my stories about 
the life and methods of the Soviet bourgeoisie.”164 The masquerade was over. 
It is important to remember that the story of political psychiatry—and the experience of 
its victims—is a Soviet story, and not just an anti-Soviet story. The narratives of each of the 
authors I examined stresses—to a palpable degree—the disconnect between the Soviet Union on 
paper and the reality of life under Brezhnev. On paper the USSR, with the most liberal 
constitution in the world and various political and economic rights and benefits promised to its 
citizens, was undeniably laudable. However, the state was constantly able to impose repressive 
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measures on its citizens by either ignoring the letter of the law (i.e. not allowing universal 
freedom of religion) or its spirit (i.e. imprisoning political dissidents for psychiatric reasons). 
Navigating the difference between the limits imposed on Soviet citizens in reality and the 
country’s praiseworthiness on paper is part of what it meant to be Soviet. 
While previous scholarship largely succeeded in capturing dissidents’ frustration with the 
Soviet system and the dehumanizing aspects of involuntary hospitalization, an examination of 
the memoirs of victims of Soviet political psychiatry likewise reveals that the program was 
decidedly more complicated than the works of Bloch, Reddaway, van Voren and other scholars 
who interrogated the topic during the 1970s and 1980s suggest. These studies focus primarily on 
the SPBs, emphasizing the abuse of prescription drugs and concentrating on how psychiatry was 
manipulated to produce the diagnoses needed to commit dissidents. In doing so, they overlook 
the difference between public and special psychiatric hospitals. A comparison of Pliushch’s 
narrative with the works of Mal'tsev, Nikolaev, and Medvedev show that, the two types of 
institutions “treated” two different types of dissidents and possessed different purposes. The 
accounts I analyze in this paper maintain that doctors at public mental institutions rarely kept 
dissidents for longer than four months and relied on “negotiating” with patients rather than 
stressing a course of drugs. This contradicts the findings of American psychiatrist Dr. Walter 
Reich who claimed, “Treatment [in the Soviet Union] emphasizes medication rather than 
talk.”165 Additionally, this paper demonstrates that even within mental hospitals the dialogue and 
power relations between dissidents and the authorities in mental hospitals was not wholly one 
sided. The dynamism of these negotiations is evidenced by the fact, that while an impressive 
number of dissidents refused to renounce their beliefs and ideals even under intense pressure, 
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many surrendered to state demands during their hospitalization. The ability of an individual 
dissident to pressure the state usually depended on his or her domestic and individual renown 
and the outside networks and contacts available to them. 
  
Despite his understanding of the flaws of the Soviet system, Mal'tsev capitulated, 
withdrawing his desire to emigrate as “unrealistic.”166 The memoir accounts I examine in this 
paper highlight the fact that, despite the universal knowledge that the Soviet state abused 
psychiatry, ignored its own laws, and was largely nonfunctional and unreformable, many people 
were willing to cooperate with the system as demonstrated by the transparency and frankness 
displayed by the psychiatrists and authority figures depicted in the authors’ work. In the end, 
Mal'tsev begrudgingly found himself among them. He lamented, “I was ashamed that I had to 
participate in such a cheap comedy."
167
 Indeed, it is easy to see elements of a cheap or tragic 
comedy in the USSR’s program of punitive psychiatry, but, as Leonid Pliushch concluded, 
“Laughter is a useless weapon in a battle against the horrors of the madhouse.”168 
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Nikolaev, Evgeniĭ. Predavshie Gippokrata. London: Overseas Publications Exchange Ltd, 1984. 
 
Novodvorskaia, Valeriia. Po tu storonu otchaianiia. Moscow: Novosti, 1993. 
 
Oleszczuk, Thomas. “An Analysis of Bias in Samizdat Sources: A Lithuanian Case Study.”  
 Soviet Studies 37, no. 1 (1985): 131-137. 
 
Paperno, Irina. Stories of the Soviet Experience: Memoirs, Diaries, Dreams. Ithaca: Cornell  
 University Press, 2009. 
 
Pliushch, Leonid. Na karnavale istorii. London: Overseas Publications Interchange, 1979. 
 56 
 
 
Podrabinek, Aleksandr. Karatelʹnaia meditsina. New York: Khronika, 1979. 
 
______. Dissidenty. Moscow: AST, 2014. 
 
Probes, Lawrence M., Vladimir Kouznetsov, et. al. “Trends in Soviet and Post-Soviet  
 Psychiatry.” The PSR Quarterly 2, no. 2 (June 1992): 67-76. 
 
Reich, Rebecca. “Inside the Psychiatric Word: Diagnosis and Self-Definition in the Late Soviet  
 Period.” Slavic Review 73, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 563-84. 
 
Reich, Walter. “The World of Soviet Psychiatry,” New York Times Magazine, January 30, 1983.  
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/30/magazine/the-world-of-soviet-psychiatry.html. 
 
Roll-Hansen, Nils. The Lysenko Effect: The Politics of Science. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books,  
 2005. 
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